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CRIMINAL LAW
Lee Hargrave*
STRICT LIABILITY OFFENSES
State v. Brown' is an important limitation on the legislature's
power to establish strict liability criminal offenses: in a unanimous
decision, the court held unconstitutional a statute making unknow-
ing possession of a controlled dangerous substance a felony.2
Neither the State nor Federal Constitution has been construed
to totally prohibit crimes without a mental element. Moral consider-
ations would suggest requiring a mental element for all offenses,
and the common law history attests to' the need for a "vicious will."
It is also true that a strong maxim of statutory construction of
criminal statutes requires a mental element when the legislation
does not clearly require strict liability.' However, substantive due
process has not been used to invalidate all strict liability offenses.
The Louisiana Supreme Court recently upheld a conviction for fail-
ing to file state income tax returns against an attack based on the
lack of a mental element.'
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University
1. 389 So. 2d 48 (La. 1980).
2. LA. R.S. 40:969(c) (Supp. 1972 & 1973). One might quarrel with the word choice
of the statute-it may be inconsistent to possess something and not know it. Generally,
possession includes both physical detention and the intent to do so. See, e.g., State v.
Birdsell, 232 La. 725, 95 So. 2d 290 (1957); LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3426-3431 & 3436; MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.01(4) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). Nonetheless, the statute must
have meant physical detention without the mental element.
One might also question whether the reference to unknowing possession was an
error in drafting. The statute as originally enacted referred to "knowingly or inten-
tionally." as did the related statute regarding Schedule I, II, I1, and V substances.
1972 La. Acts, No. 634, § 1. The next year, an amendment to the pertinent statutes
made technical changes regarding the respective penal provisions of all five Schedules.
Only Schedule IV and Schedule V possession was changed to "unknowingly or inten-
tionally," even though the penalties for violation remained the same as those of the
other Schedules. 1973 La. Acts, No. 207, §§ 3-7 (emphasis added). In addition, it would
seem an odd word choice to penalize "unknowingly or intentionally to possess" when
simple reference to unknowing possession would be as broad as need be to cast a wide
net.
3. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
4. State v. Terrell, 352 So. 2d 220 (La. 1977). Federal statutes are routinely
upheld. See, e.g., United States v. Wiesenfeld Warehouse Co., 375 U.S. 86 (1964);
United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922); United States v. Pruner, 606 F.2d 871 (9th
Cir. 1979).
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In some areas, however, strict liability is limited. If the offense
tends to discourage the exercise of first amendment free speech
rights, it is required that a mental element be proved. In Smith v.
California' an obscenity conviction was overturned for failure to prove
knowledge of the contents of the allegedly obscene book. In a more
far-reaching decision, the Court in Lambert v. California' found
a constitutional violation in an ordinance that made it a crime for a
convicted felon to remain in the city for more than five days without
registration with the chief of police. The Court relied on the due
process clause:
Where a person did not know of the duty to register and where
there was no proof of the probability of such knowledge, he may
not be convicted consistently with due process. Were it other-
wise, the evil would be as great as it is when the law is written
in print too fine to read or in a language foreign to the communi-
ty.7
This "probability of the knowledge that some act is criminal"
distinction became crucial in United States v. Freed,8 a case invol-
ving a prosecution under the National Firearms Act for possession of
an unregistered firearm. However, as the court in Brown points out,
the Freed defendants knew they were possessing weapons even if
they may not have known of the registration requirements. In
Brown, it would be possible for one to be convicted even if he did
not know he had physical control over a dangerous substance.'
The due process analysis used in these cases is basically a fun-
damental fairness inquiry. In Brown, arguments on the side of the
individual interest are: (1) the fact that the penalty imposed was
high'" (a felony punishable by up to 5 years at hard labor and fine of
$5,000), (2) it is not the kind of public welfare offense where absolute
5. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
6. 355 U.S. 225 (1957).
7. Id at 229-30.
8. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
9. See 352 So. 2d 220 (La. 1977). Even as the statute there has been amended to
make the offense an intentional failure to file a tax return, the intent required is the
intent to do the act; ie., intent not to file, as opposed to knowingly not filing when one
knows one has a duty to file. In Terrell, the defendant's actions were intentional (he
must have adverted to the fact of not filing), and therefore arguably he met the pres-
ent requirement. Part of the confusion comes from a popular, non-technical notion that
intent requires some kind of corrupt element. But as defined in the Criminal Code, the
requirement is simply that of adverting to consequences. Louisiana might have done
better to follow the federal example and refer to a willful failure to file, rather than an
intentional failure to file. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7203.
10. Cf. Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575, 155 A.2d 825 (1959).
[Vol. 42
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LA W, 1980-1981
liability is essential to the success of a regulatory plan," (3) it is not
the kind of regulation about which a person would have a reasonable
sense of the probable wrongness of the act, 2 and (4) it is not the
kind of conduct that is generally considered morally bad, and thus
known generally to be proscribed. 3 Even as a utilitarian measure,
the statute seems to have little to say for itself; if deterrence is its
purpose, the statute would seem to be of little effect when one
possesses something and does not know he possesses it. Presumably,
it could be argued that convictions would be easier if no knowledge
need be proved. However, considering the ease with which in-
ferences of knowledge can be made, it is not likely that many convic-
tions will be lost because of this requirement.
CORPORATE LIABILITY-WILLFUL FAILURE
A simple opinion in State v. Main Motors, Inc." masks some
basic questions about corporate criminal liability and about the
meaning of the term "willful" as used in Louisiana criminal statutes.
At issue was an alleged violation, by a corporation and its president,
of a sales tax collection statute making it an offense to "willfully
[fail] to collect or truthfully account for or pay over such tax."'5 The
allegations of failure to account focused on transactions which oc-
curred in the automobile dealership's parts department, and did not
involve the more substantial sales tax collections on sales of automo-
biles. 8 Although both the corporation and its president were accused
of the offense, the trial court found the president innocent and con-
victed only the corporation. 7 The supreme court sustained that con-
viction.
Willful
The Criminal Code does not define "willful" and generally avoids
its use, presumably because of the imprecision in the concept."
11. See, e.g., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280-81 (1943) (shipping
adulterated and misbranded drugs in interstate commerce); United States v. Crow, 439
F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds. 404 U.S. 1009 (1972) (possession of
firearms).
12. United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601 (1971). See text at note 7, supra.
13. See generally W. CLARK & W. MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRIMES
21-22 (6th ed. 1958).
14. 383 So. 2d 327 (La. 1979).
15. LA. R.S. 47:1641 (1950).
16. See Record at 4.
17. Id. at 42.
18. Statutes outside the Code occasionally use the term. See. e.g., LA. R.S. 12:959
(Supp. 1969) ("willful misconduct" of corporate directors and officers).
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"Willful"-a term derived from general common law notions"-is,
by virtue of the uncertainty involved, a difficult term to apply. In-
deed, Justice Dennis' concurring opinion in Main Motors notes these
vagueness problems."0 The majority opinion by Justice Blanche does
not attempt to define the concept of "willfullness," but does state, in
accord with the common law background: "Proof of willful behavior
is similar to proof of intent; it requires that the mind of the defend-
ant be probed."'" Clearly, more than negligence is required. As in
the definition of intent in the Criminal Code, it is at least required
that there be adversion to consequences or an active desire of the
consequence." As the stated consequence in the relevant statute is
not truthfully accounting for the tax collected, the requirement is at
least desiring or adverting to failing to truthfully account.
However, to the extent that relevant assistance can be obtained
from similar federal tax statutes where the concept of willfullness is
well developed, there may be more required-the additional require-
ment that there be knowledge of the legal duty involved. As the
United States Supreme Court has recognized, there must be "a vol-
untary intentional violation of a known legal duty."23 The majority
opinion in Main Motors is not clear as to the extent that such a
knowledge requirement is demanded, but the opinion does leave
room to develop Lousisiana law in a manner that would ensure a
rigorous mental element similar to the common law and the federal
standard.
More troublesome in the opinion is the strong reliance on the
presumption of correctness in the lower court and the reliance on
"some evidence" to support the verdict. That "some evidence" was
quite weak. Since the president of the corporation was found not
guilty, and since the only other evidence in the record was the
testimony of the bookkeeper who made the report and the tax
auditor, it is difficult to conclude that agents of the corporation
were intentionally violating a known duty or intentionally making
untrue reports. The court relies on the fact that for some periods
under scrutiny, the "percentages of wrongful deductions disallowed
varied from 57% to 99%."2" The full records reveal, however, that
19. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 192 (1972); Turner, The Mental Ele-
ment in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31 (1936).
20. 383 So. 2d at 329-30.
21. I& at 328, 329.
22. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:10 (1950).
23. United States v. Pompino, 429 U.S. 10, 12 (1976). See also United States v.
Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973); 26 U.S.C. § 7206 (1954).
24. 383 So. 2d at 329.
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those errors were not always against the state, and there was no
pattern of depriving the state of revenues in determining which
sales were tax exempt. The amounts involved were minimal. Indeed,
in light of the normal criminal law burden of proof, it is more
reasonable on this account to suspect incompetence than intent to
violate a known duty. The record reveals that although invoices for
sales were written by a salesperson, they were then transferred on
a computer to different accounts." While it is true that computer error
would not necessarily be an adequate explanation, the incorrect and
imprecise coding of computer information by a secretary would
seem to be an adequate defense to a crime involving a mental element.
Furthermore, basic policy concerns should call for the court to
require a strong burden of proof where criminal statutes are used to
enforce what is essentially a civil duty to collect taxes for the state.
Use of the criminal process in these areas approaches a misuse of
the criminal law; the kind of trivial application of the state's massive
machinery that tends to foster disrespect for the criminal law. As
Justice Jackson put it in another context:
The United States has a system of taxation by confession. That
a people so numerous, scattered and individualistic annually
assesses itself with a tax liability, often in highly burdensome
amounts, is a reassuring sign of the stability and vitality of our
system of self-government . . . . It will be a sad day for the
revenues if the good will of the people toward their taxing
system is frittered away in efforts to accomplish by taxation
moral reforms that cannot be accomplished by direct
legislation."
It is just as apt to say that it will be a sad day for the criminal law
if the good will of the people for the criminal justice system is frit-
tered away in efforts to use the coercive apparatus of the criminal
law in de minimus, technical tax cases when other means of enforce-
ment are available.
Corporate Liability
More disturbing, and not discussed in the opinion, is the issue of
corporate criminal liability for the failure to account once it is
established that the president of the corporation is not guilty of the
offense. The only other natural persons whose conduct could have
been willful violations were low level clerical and secretarial
employees of the automobile dealership. Making such acts of low
25. Record at 30.
26. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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level employees the acts of the corporation may be consistent with
general corporate liability and has been generally accepted with
regard to strict liability offenses as adequate to make the corpora-
tion guilty.7 But such a broad respondeat superior concept when
dealing with crimes involving a mental element is revolutionary and
inconsistent with the general view in the United States.
In making corporations liable for crimes involving a mental ele-
ment, it is usually required that some part of the "thinking" or
"policy making" part of the corporation be involved for the corpora-
tion to be liable.2 ' As the Model Penal Code puts it, the corporation
is guilty of such offenses if "the commission of the offense was
authorized, requested, commanded, performed or recklessly
tolerated by the board of directors or by a high managerial agent
acting in behalf of the corporation within the scope of his office or
employment."'
Louisiana does not specifically address the question of the men-
tal state required for corporate liability, although its adoption of cor-
porate liability was part of the modern movement away from cor-
porate immunity for crime." The related requirement of high
managerial misconduct for traditional offenses would seem to be
part of that tradition which the state has accepted.
At the least, such a radical imposition of corporate liability for
crime would require some discussion and explanation. It is hoped
that Main Motors is only the beginning of the process of clearly
defining corporate criminal liability. There is still a great deal more
to be said on the subject as the cases develop.
INTENT
Intent to commit a felony or theft
In addition to an unauthorized entering, commission of the crime
of burglary requires that the offender have specific intent to commit
a felony or theft therein at the time of entry." This specific intent
burden is great-proof that the offender subjectively desired the
consequence, not that a reasonable person would have so desired.
The supreme court in State v. Marcello32 reversed a conviction for
burglary when the testimony showed that the defendant, who had
27. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 19, at § 33.
28. Id. See generally Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV.
21 (1957).
29. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.07 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
30. See CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:2, comment (Supp. 1962 & 1977).
31. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:62 (Supp. 1972, 1977 & 1980).
32. 385 So. 2d 244 (La. 1980).
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been sleeping near the air conditioning equipment on the roof of an
office building, entered a restroom in the building to wash. Use of
another's soap and water might well be unauthorized use of mov-
ables," but it certainly is not a felony; and without proof of a
specific intent to deprive another permanently of those things, it is
not a theft." The court has in the past gone to some lengths to allow
inferences of intent to commit a felony or theft from slight
evidence.35 In Marcello the court was clearly correct in limiting that
tendency and in reversing the conviction. The defendant, of course,
would be guilty of criminal trepass 3 -for an unauthorized and inten-
tional entry upon a structure-which, with its misdemeanor penalty,
seems the more fitting punishment for such slight anti-social con-
duct. Again, as with the tax enforcement, one would hope that the
criminal law would be used more selectively for important and
serious offenses that cause substantial danger to other human beings,
rather than for stretching the clear meaning of words in an effort to
make serous felonies out of conduct that causes little societal harm.
Intent to distribute
In State v. Harveston3" the supreme court reversed a conviction
for possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute because of
the failure to prove the required specific intent. Justice Lemmon's
well-reasoned opinion is an example of an appellate court's applica-
tion of a strong specific intent standard in order to reverse a convic-
tion based on slim inferences. In Harveston, three ounces of mari-
juana had been found in defendant's wooden leg-in addition to
seeds, ashes and gleanings of marijuana discovered in and about his
house. While the court agreed that intent to distribute can be infer-
red,' the quantity here was not inconsistent with personal use. The
presence of balance scales did not indicate use for weighing pot as
they were located in a grocery store and were not shown to be of
the type customarily used to measure marijuana. With no other
evidence, there was inadequate proof of intent to distribute.
Intent to defraud
Although the Criminal Code requires the intent to defraud as an
element in several crimes, 9 it does not provide a definition of the
33. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:68 (Supp. 1980 & 1981).
34. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1968, 1970 & 1972).
35. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 302 So. 2d 284 (La. 1974).
36. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:63 (Supp. 1960 & 1964).
37. 389 So. 2d 63 (La. 1980).
38. 1I at 64.
39. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:53 & 57 (Supp. 1980). 70.1 (Supp. 1979), 71 & 72
(1950).
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term.'" One is forced to turn to the imprecise formulas of the com-
mon law, from which the Criminal Code borrowed the concept of
fraud, to attempt to gain some guidance in applying the re-
quirements. An example of the difficulties involved may be found in
article 53 of the Criminal Code-arson with intent to defraud.
Though one might argue for a broad application of the concept of
fraud in light of the comment to article 53 ("It [this crime] is intend-
ed here to protect any person, firm or corporation which is injured
financially by the destruction of the property."), that comment must
be read in light of the previous sentence which indicates that the ex-
pansion was to go beyond preventing the defrauding of insurance
companies and not to broaden the scope of fraudulent conduct."
At the least, the requirement of fraud involves some element of
cheating, or of presenting as true information that which is false.'2
This is recognized in State v. Baize3 in which the supreme court
reversed a conviction for obtaining hotel accommodations with the
intent to defraud." The facts indicate that there existed a dispute
between the defendant and the New Orleans Holiday Inn East about
whether the defendant had been informed that rates would increase
after December 27-the Sugar Bowl season. It was shown that upon
registering the defendant had paid for one night and had subse-
quently paid all that was due through December 27. It was also
shown that defendant was willing to pay the amount that would
have been due if the increased rates had not gone into effect. The
defendant objected to the innkeeper's conduct (including the refusal
to release the defendant's dog until she paid the entire amount
demanded), and complained to Holiday Inn central management
about her situation. It would appear then that the supreme court
was clearly correct in reversing for failure to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was obtaining accommodations
with intent to defraud. Little evidence was presented of intent to
cheat or intent to present as true information that which was false.
40. Cf. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1968, 1970 & 1972) defining theft as
the taking or misappropriation "by means of fraudulent conduct, practices, or
representations." (Emphasis added). Again the Code does not define "fraudulent."
41. "In many states this crime is limited merely to fraud against insurance com-
panies." CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:53, comments (1950).
42. The common law offense of "cheating" involved action which affected the
public at large as distinguished from a "private fraud" which merely affected a single
individual. However, the other requisite elements were substantially the same. See W.
CLARK & W. MARSHALL, supra note 13, at § 12.30 (6th ed. 1958). See also W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT, supra note 19, at 652-54, discussing fraud as an element in the crime of
embezzlement.
43. 385 So. 2d 221 (La. 1980).
44. LA. R.S. 21:21 (Supp. 1958, 1968 & 1977).
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Again, this appears to be the kind of dispute that should be set-
tled in civil court. Cases involving enforcement of increased hotel
rates during peak seasons should not be allowed to clutter the
dockets of the criminal courts, where more important societal harms
demand attention.
ATTEMPT- ATTEMPTED CONCEALMENT
Article 27 of the Criminal Code is a general attempt statute
which covers attempts of any crime. Exceptions from this pervasive
article are few: to make an offense of attempting to conspire to com-
mit a crime would weaken the "tending directly" act requirement
and would thwart the principle against punishing one for evil
thoughts when there is little or no act undertaken to carry them
out." In addition, since attempt requires a specific intent to commit
a crime (to actively desire the prescribed consequences), one cannot
logically attempt a crime which is defined so as to preclude the in-
tent to do the act. Since negligent homicide is defined as requiring
disregard of consequences, it is impossible to also intend those con-
sequences. Therefore, attempted negligent homicide is a crime
which cannot exist." Similarly, in State v. Booker," the supreme
court stated that it was impossible to attempt felony murder, since
by definition it (felony murder) is a killing without the intent to kill.
This rule against inconsistent attempts applies even though the
general responsive verdict provision, article 814 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, would nominally provide that such a verdict is
responsive.
More troublesome is the case of State v. Dyer," which seems to
reason that the crime of attempted concealment of a weapon'9 does
not exist because it covers the same conduct prohibited by the
substantive offense of concealment of a weapon. In Dyer, the defend-
ant was arrested on a public street with a weapon protruding
visibly from his front pocket. He was charged with attempted con-
cealment, and the supreme court, in a five to two opinion, sustained
a motion to quash the information for failure to charge an offense
punishable under a valid statute.
A major problem with Dyer, assuming that its premises regard-
ing the nature of attempt and concealment are correct, is that there
45. See Note, Criminal Law and Procedure, 9 LA. L. REV. 413 (1949), and cases
cited therein.
46. State v. Adams, 210 La. 782, 28 So. 2d 269 (1946).
47. 385 So. 2d 1186 (La. 1980) (Lemmon, J., concurring).
48. 388 So. 2d 374 (La. 1980).
49. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:95(A)(1) (1950).
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is no reason why the same conduct cannot fit the definition of more
than one crime. Article 4 of the Criminal Code contemplates such a
situation and allows the prosecutor the option to charge with either.
More in point, article 27(c) clearly states that one can be convicted
of an attempt even if one completes the crime. The court is simply
without authority in arguing that conduct that meets the elements
of attempt cannot be punished as such if it is conduct that also
meets the elements of the substantive crime.
Another problem with Dyer involves a consideration of mental
elements. Even assuming the correctness of the early view that one
can be guilty of concealment of a weapon that is only partially hid-
den, 50 the substantive offense and the attempt are not identical, for
the two crimes have different mental elements. Attempt requires
the more demanding specific intent to commit the crime. The sub-
stantive offense as defined in article 95 requires only a general in-
tent-the language "intentional concealment" is use of the word "in-
tent" or "intentional" without modification, and it therefore fits the
requirement of article 11 that such a statement refers to the less
rigorous general criminal intent.5"
It is submitted that the proper approach is to follow the reason-
ing in State v. Fluker"2 and the legislative history traced therein,
and to hold that the offense of concealment is not committed unless
the weapon is entirely concealed. As is argued in Fluker, prior
statutes required that weapons be "in full open view," but the cur-
rent statute suppresses that word formula in favor of the term "con-
cealed." By all meanings of that word, a weapon that is partially
shown is not concealed. An example of this approach may be found
in In re Ogletree.53
Indeed, to agree with the rather convoluted approach of Fluker
(guilt upon partial concealment if there was the intent to totally con-
ceal) is to raise some close constitutional questions. The delegates to
the 1974 Constitutional Convention felt quite strongly about protec-
ting the right to keep and bear arms." The constitution does except
50. State v. Bias, 37 La. Ann. 259 (1885).
51. But see State v. Fluker, 311 So. 2d 863 (La. 1975), which in dictum suggests
that article 95 requires specific intent. That view is inconsistent with article 11.
52. 311 So. 2d 863 (La. 1975).
53. 244 So. 2d 288 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971).
54. LA. CONST. art. I, § 11 provides: "The right of each citizen to keep and bear
arms shall not be abridged, but this provision shall not prevent the passage of laws to
prohibit the carrying of weapons' concealed on the person." See Hargrave, The
Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV. 1, 35-37
(1974).
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concealed weapons from protection but it also clearly protects the
carrying of weapons that are not concealed. The underlying policy is
that as long as potential adversaries are warned that a person is
carrying a weapon, they can adjust their behavior accordingly. Only
if that warning is absent-which would be when the weapon cannot
be seen-are members of the public put at an unfair peril. It may
have been bad policy not to allow prohibition of carrying all
weapons, but that was the clear policy choice, and to allow a strained
interpretation of "concealed" to mean partial concealment is to of-
fend this basic policy. After all, how could one ever carry a weapon
except perhaps in a clear plastic holder? How could one ever hold a
weapon without partially concealing it?
It would appear that the best solution would be to require full
concealment for the substantive offense, thus letting the attempt
statute cover instances in which there is not full concealment of the
weapon, though there is an active desire to fully conceal.
DANGEROUS WEAPON
The Louisiana Supreme Court has been less than consistent in
construing the dangerous weapon definition. However, two cases
decided this term suggest a more stable approach. The key problem
has been that the standard for determining whether a thing is a
dangerous weapon depends on the manner of use, and not on any notion
of inherent dangerousness.55 Absent any mention of a pistol as a
dangerous weapon in all instances, it follows that even as to a loaded
pistol, it must be proven that this was an instrumentality, which "in
the manner used, was calculated or likely to produce death or great
bodily harm."5
55. CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:2(3 (Supp. 1962, 1976 & 1977) provides:
"'Dangerous weapon' includes any gas, liquid or other substance or instrumentality,
which, in the manner used, is calculated or likely to produce death or great bodily
harm." (Emphasis added).
56. The statement in State v. Gould, 395 So. 2d 647, 655 (La. 1981), that "A loaded
pistol is undoubtedly a dangerous weapon irrespective of how used or exhibited," is
dictum unnecessary to the holding in that case. The statement is inconsistent with the
statutory definition. Further, the comment to article 2(3) clearly states, "The test as
given in the article is not whether the weapon is inherently dangerous, but.whether it
is dangerous 'in the manner used.'" If one accepts the court's suggestion that because
the article states that "dangerous weapon" includes it means that the definition is not
exclusive and thus that the court is free to expand the notion of dangerous weapon as
it chooses, then one has to apply the same argument to article 2(7). That article pro-
vides that "person" includes a human being from the moment of fertilization. Thus, the
court could expand the term "person" as it chooses, a result hardly consistent with
State v. Brown, 378 So. 2d 916 (La. 1980).
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"Calculated . . . to produce death or great bodily harm. "
To fulfill this requirement, it must be shown that in the mind of
the offender, there existed a calculation or intent to produce death
or great bodily harm. It would seem self-evident that since the em-
phasis is on the use of the thing, and it is the offender who controls
the use and calculates how it is to be used, this element of the test
is a subjective one that focuses on the mind of the offender. This
aspect of the test has produced little difficulty.
"Likely . . . to produce death or great bodily harm."
The focus here is objective. At issue is not the mind of the
defendant nor the mind of the victim, but rather an objective view
of the situation. The pertinent inquiry is whether the use of the
thing involved is likely to provoke the kind of charged situation in
which someone (offender, victim, or third person) is likely to cause
death or great bodily harm. This theory, coming from State v.
Levi 7 and State v. Johnston," has problems, for it borders on being
a back door approach to using an "inherently dangerous object"
theory. Yet, the objective approach does appear to have become
relatively well established, and it has colorable support in the
statutory word formula. The main problem with this approach has
been the attempt to extend it to encompass situations where an ob-
jective view would result in the thing not being considered a
dangerous weapon but the victim subjectively believing he was in
great danger. In 1979, the supreme court in State v. Bonier" re-
jected this proposed enlargement and clearly held that belief of the
victim that he was to receive death or great bodily harm was not
determinative of the issue. It was also clearly established that the
issue of danger should provoke an objective determination, center-
ing on the method of use and the facts surrounding the use of the
weapon.
In the current term State v. Byrd" has reinforced and further
explained Bonier. In Byrd, a defendant approached the take-out win-
dow of a fast food outlet and ordered a piece of fried chicken. The
employee asked for payment. The defendant. pulled a toy pistol from
his pocket, pointed it in the air, and demanded all the money in the
register. When the employee said there was no money, the defend-
ant grabbed the chicken and started to walk away. The employee
57. 259 La. 591, 250 So. 2d 751 (1971).
58. 207 La. 161, 20 So. 2d 741 (1944).
59. .367 So. 2d 824 (La. 1979).
60. 385 So. 2d 248 (La. 1980).
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then grabbed the piece of chicken and closed the window. The
defendant then left.
The lower court convicted the defendant of attempted armed
robbery. The supreme court reasoned that there was not sufficient
proof of use of a dangerous weapon and entered a judgment of guilty
of attempted simple robbery.' While the court agreed that, in some
instances, a toy weapon might produce a likelihood of death or great
bodily harm, the facts here indicated otherwise. No one was hurt
and the victim was hardly in fear of his life or bodily harm-he
grabbed the chicken piece and closed the window. While the victim's
subjective reaction is not conclusive in this regard, it certainly
would be evidence of the fact that a reasonable person in such a
situation would not react violently.
Instrumentality? The finger in the pocket?
Since State v. Calvin,"' it has been generally accepted that a
part of the human body does not qualify as a dangerous weapon. Such
a holding is consistent with the existence of the separate offenses of
simple battery, second degree battery, and aggravated battery and
the gradation of punishment implicit there. It would follow that the
"finger in the pocket" would not qualify as a dangerous weapon
even if the victims believed the defendant was armed and were so
fearful that they might react violently in a way that an objective
decision could be made that there was a likelihood of death or great
bodily harm."3 This principle was accepted in State v. Elam,"4
although the outcome of the case makes one question how dis-
ingenuous the court was in a footnote: "This holding does not make
any extension of Levi nor do we hold that a 'hand in a pocket' is a
dangerous weapon.""S In Elam, the defendant exhibited no weapon
during a robbery, although he did threaten to shoot the clerk in a
convenience store if the clerk did not cooperate. Officers conducting
a surveillance of the store followed the defendant and stopped him
two blocks away. No weapon was found on the defendant's person or
in his car. The two blocks from the store to the point of apprehen-
sion were searched and no weapon was discovered. The facts were
61. For a discussion of the problem of appellate review and judgment of convic-
tion for lesser included offenses, see Note, Appellate Review and the Lesser Included
Offense Doctrine in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. REv. 284 (1981).
62. 209 La. 257, 24 So. 2d 467 (1945).
63. The argument that the cloth in the pocket is a non-human instrumentality is
probably too facile to stand up in light of the basic policy of gradation of offenses that
would be defeated by accepting the argument.
64. 312 So. 2d 318 (La. 1975).
65. Id. at 322. See text at note 59, supra.
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seemingly overwhelming that the defendant, in fact, had no gun.
Nevertheless, the supreme court was willing to stretch the "some
evidence" rule and hold that the threat to shoot was enough
evidence from which the jury could make the inference that the
defendant in fact had a weapon with which to shoot.
State v. Gould,"6 on rehearing, rejects Elam and reverses a con-
viction based on similar facts. The supreme court, relying on
Jackson v. Virginia," found that no rational trier of fact could have
concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a pistol
on his person at the time of the robbery. In Gould, a bank robber ex-
hibited no gun. However, his robbery note handed to the teller
read: "BE CALM & RELAX AND YOU WON'T GET SHOT!" The
defendant did not have a finger in his pocket, though there was
some question about whether there was a bulge in his coat pocket.
The court stated that the jury must have believed the defendant
had a pistol in his pocket, but it then reversed the conviction of armed
robbery on grounds of insufficient evidence to support the verdict."
The case seems correct in applying a more realistic test and
moving away from the strained construction of the Elam opinion.
The solution, if we are to accept some notion of inherent dangerous-
ness, should be a legislative one, and not a bending of the rather
clear meaning of the Code definition. Indeed, the substantial volume
of state and federal legislation in recent years dealing with controls
of handguns indicates that the legislature can move in this direction
if it wants to. The wording of article 95 of the Criminal Code, for ex-
ample, is quite clear; it refers to "concealment of any firearm, or
other instrumentality customarily used or intended for probable use
as a dangerous weapon . . . ." The clearly more demanding formula
of article 2(3) should be applied until changed.
THEFT - VALUE
The value of items taken can make a significant difference in the
66. 395 So. 2d 647 (La. 1981).
67. 443 U.S. 307 (1979). The standard to be met under Jackson is "whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime had been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt .... 395 So. 2d at 653. The court went so far as to state that if the
"some evidence" rule were applicable, it may have ruled differently. 395 So. 2d at 656.
68. The court suggests that if a real pistol were in the pocket, it would be a
dangerous weapon, but if it were a toy pistol, it would not be. 395 So. 2d at 656. This
is beyond the holding, and indeed would seem questionable. If the issue is the matter
of likelihood of death or great bodily harm, it should not matter whether the pistol is
real or not. What should matter is whether it looks so real that a reasonable person,
judged by an objective standard, would react violently to the situation.
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possible penalty upon conviction of theft offenses. 9 However, the
Criminal Code does not specify a general test for determination of
value. Though an amendment to article 2(2) specifies that in cases of
"shoplifting," value is the "actual retail price of the property at the
time of the offense,""0 it does not define shoplifting. Louisiana has
not adopted a definition similar to the federal rule that value means
"face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale or retail,
whichever is greater."'"
In the past, jury determinations of value had been given little
attention by the supreme court. Cases have allowed virtually any
evidence of value to go to the jury, including the victim's opinions."2
The court has generally upheld jury determinations-even apparent
compromise figures-on the basis of there being "competent"
evidence to support the factual determination." However, relatively
easy reliance on the jury finding must give way to the requirement
under Jackson v. Virginia" of proving all elements of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.
In State v. Peoples," the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a
jury determination of guilt of receiving stolen goods worth more
than $500-involved was office equipment ranging from two to
seven years of age. The state's evidence consisted of little more
than a showing that the items cost $561.80 when purchased, and
that it would cost $969 to replace the stolen items with new ones.
Considering the age and condition of the equipment, such testimony
did little to determine its value at the time of the crime. Additional-
ly, an expert in the field of used office equipment called by the
defense testified that the stolen items could be valued from $220 to
$400. This was an adequate basis to support the conclusion that the
jury's determination of a value of more than $500 was not supported
by the record.
69. Under CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:67 (Supp. 1968, 1970 & 1972), the penalty
for theft can reach ten years imprisonment and a $3,000 fine for theft of items worth
$500 or more; two years and $2.000 for theft of items worth $100 up to $500; and six
months imprisonment and a $500 fine for items worth less than $100. A similar pattern
applies to receiving stolen goods under CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:69 (Supp. 1972).
70. 1977 La. Acts, No. 128, § 1, amending CRIMINAL CODE: LA. R.S. 14:2(2) (1950).
71. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1948) (emphasis added).
72. See State v. Curtis, 319 So. 2d 434 (La. 1975); State v. McCray, 305 So. 2d 433
(La. 1974).
73. See State v. Tullos, 190 La. 184, 182 So. 321 (1938); State v. Young, 165 La.
120, 115 So. 407 (1928).
74. 443 U.S. 307 (1978).
75. 383 So. 2d 1006 (La. 1980).
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